Balancing Central Authority and Local Interests: Insights from Macau's Gambling Law Amendment

This paper investigates the dynamics of legislative politics within the unique political context of the Macau Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China. Drawing on newly collected data from roll-call votes and committee deliberations during its fifth and sixth legislative terms, this study shifts the focus from electoral processes and resolution proposals to the analysis of bill proposals with the potential to become law. The findings reveal a structural dichotomy between a large, cohesive pro-establishment faction and a smaller, more fragmented opposition, contrasting with previous research that suggested a more balanced opposition. Further analysis of committee deliberations indicates that this stable dichotomy allows regime loyalists to voice dissent without appearing rebellious, enabling ruling elites to gauge and respond to constituents’ preferences on non-sensitive issues. This dynamic informs our understanding of Macau SAR’s characterisation as an exemplar of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model.